High-Frequency Trading and the Flash Crash: Structural Weaknesses in the Securities Markets and Proposed Regulatory Responses by Poirier, Ian
Hastings Business Law Journal
Volume 8
Number 2 Summer 2012 Article 5
Summer 1-1-2012
High-Frequency Trading and the Flash Crash:
Structural Weaknesses in the Securities Markets
and Proposed Regulatory Responses
Ian Poirier
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_business_law_journal
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Business Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ian Poirier, High-Frequency Trading and the Flash Crash: Structural Weaknesses in the Securities Markets and Proposed Regulatory
Responses, 8 Hastings Bus. L.J. 445 (2012).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_business_law_journal/vol8/iss2/5
 
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL 445 
High-Frequency Trading and the Flash Crash: 
Structural Weaknesses in the Securities 
Markets and Proposed Regulatory Responses 
Ian Poirier* 
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 6th, 2010, a single trader in Kansas City was either lazy or 
sloppy in executing a large trade on the E-Mini futures market.1  Twenty 
minutes later, the broad U.S. securities markets were down almost a trillion 
dollars, losing at their lowest point more than nine percent of their value.2  
Certain stocks lost nearly all of their value from just minutes before.3  
Faced with the blistering pace of the decline, many market participants 
opted to cease trading entirely, including both human traders and High 
Frequency Trading (“HFT”) programs.4  This withdrawal of liquidity5 
accelerated the crash, as fewer buyers were able to absorb the rapid-fire 
selling pressure of the HFT programs.6  Within two hours, prices were back 
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2012; B.A., Psychology,
Williams College, 2007. The author thanks Gene Crew for his guidance, as well as the editors of the 
Hastings Business Law Journal. 
1. REPORT OF THE STAFFS OF THE CFTC AND SEC TO THE JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES, FINDINGS REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010, at 5, 
Sept. 30, 2010, available at www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf [hereinafter 
“FINAL REPORT”]; Graham Bowley, The New Speed of Money, Reshaping Markets, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 
1, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/business/02speed.html?ref=highfrequency 
algorithmictrading&pagewanted=all; The E-mini futures contracts are tied to the value of the S&P 500 
equity index, and is frequently used to hedge positions or to make directional bets on broad market 
movements. The E-mini futures contracts are tied to the value of the S&P 500 equity index, and is 
frequently used to hedge positions or to make directional bets on broad market movements. 
2. David M. Serritella, Recent Development: High Speed Trading Begets High Speed Regulation:
SEC Response to Flash Crash, Rash, 2010 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL’Y 433, 433 (2010); Edward E. 
Kaufman Jr., Carl M. Levin, Preventing the Next Flash Crash, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2011, at A27. 
3. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS REGARDING THE
MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010, at 34 (May 18, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/sec-cftc-
prelimreport.pdf [hereinafter “PRELIMINARY REPORT”]. 
4. Id. at 6, 8, 69.
5. “Liquidity reflects the ease with which certain amounts of an asset can be bought or sold
without exerting a significant effect on its price. Higher market liquidity can be interpreted as a greater 
collective willingness to execute orders at given prices.”  PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 65. 
6. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 2–3. 
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near their pre-crash levels. It took the SEC more than five months of 
research to determine what sparked the crash.7 
This precipitous market crash was made possible, if not inevitable, by 
the growing interconnectivity of the securities markets and the proliferation 
of high-frequency trading.  These two factors combine to create a situation 
where trillions of dollars of wealth can be destroyed before human traders 
can react, often for reasons that are unknown even to the program’s 
designers.  As a result, extreme market movements can perpetuate 
themselves across the U.S. markets almost entirely without human 
involvement. 
This note will illuminate the relatively unknown high-frequency 
trading industry. First, it will examine the state of the industry, in context 
with the flash crash of May 6th, 2010.  Next, it will explain why the hodge-
podge of regulations struggling to control this industry is entirely 
inadequate to prevent another crash.  Finally, I will suggest a better 
solution—relatively noninvasive controls that could be put in place to 
prevent future flash crashes and restore investor confidence. 
The initial cause of the crash in the futures market is simple.  A trader 
seeking to sell more than $4 billion worth of futures contracts—which 
usually takes more than five hours to execute—chose to sell the contracts 
with an automated execution algorithm.8  This type of algorithm is one of 
the simplest types of “automated trading”: the trader enters a few criteria, 
usually price, time, and volume limitations for the trade, and the program 
then executes the trade without any further human involvement.9  In this 
case, the trader did not limit his selling program in terms of price or time, 
and the program sold the entire order of 75,000 futures contracts in just 
twenty minutes.10  This trade set off a domino effect of high-speed 
reactions from an army of high-frequency trading programs that has grown 
to dominate the markets 
For such a large and aggressive trade to drive down the price of the 
futures contracts is nothing new.  It is for this reason that careful traders 
take many hours to execute trades of this magnitude, hiding the size of their 
trade and seeking out pockets of liquidity that can absorb their sales.11  As 
such, that this trade drove the e-mini futures market down three percent in 
four minutes is neither surprising nor particularly worrisome.12  Rather, it is 
7. See generally FINAL REPORT, supra note 1. 
8. Id.  See also Matt Phillips, Accenture’s Flash Crash: What’s an “Intermarket Sweep Order,”
WALL ST. J. BLOG (May 7, 2010, 5:51 PM), available at http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2010/05/07/ 
accentures-flash-crash-whats-an-intermarket-sweep-order/ (describing how this type of algorithmic 
works). 
9. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 14. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 15.
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the ensuing market-wide crash and subsequent rebound that is worrying to 
investors and regulators alike.  Most disturbingly, the flash crash, as the 
May 6th market event has come to be known, exposed fundamental 
structural weaknesses in the modern financial markets.  The SEC has 
proven unable to address these weaknesses. 
Part II of this note will examine the current structure of the domestic 
securities markets, including the changes over the last several years that 
have laid the groundwork for precipitous market events such as the flash 
crash.  The most relevant of these changes is the rise of high frequency 
trading to a position of market dominance.  Part III will evaluate the 
regulatory framework in place to prevent market breaks, both before and 
after the flash crash.  Part IV will illustrate why the current and proposed 
regulations are inadequate to prevent future crashes.  Finally, Part V will 
offer alternative solutions that could be used to render the markets safer, 
more predictable, and more worthy of investor confidence.  The core of the 
suggested regulations is that whenever market volatility (as measured by 
the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index, or “VIX”) reaches a 
point at which human traders withdraw from the market, rules should be 
triggered to slow the market to a speed that traders can follow. 
II. THE CURRENT RISK: THE STRUCTURE OF THE MODERN
MARKET AND THE RISE OF HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING
The modern securities market bears little resemblance to the markets 
of a decade ago, let alone the open-outcry trading forums from which they 
developed.13  The transformation of market infrastructure has been dramatic 
and complete, and has enabled algorithmic trading programs to quietly 
assume a role of market dominance.  While the average American may not 
have noticed the seismic shifts in terms of structure, regulation, and 
technology in the financial markets, he probably has noticed that his 
personal financial well being is now inexorably tied to their performance.14  
The middle class used to prepare for retirement by saving in bank accounts, 
but now the majority of Americans tie their futures to the health of the 
markets, with 401(k)s, mutual funds, and other investments seen as the 
only way to afford retirement.15  This is an important change from as 
13. SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, RELEASE NO. 34-61358, CONCEPT RELEASE ON
EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE, (Jan. 21, 2010) [hereinafter “CONCEPT RELEASE”]; see also Jerry W. 
Markham & Daniel J. Hardy, For Whom the Bell Tolls: The Demise of Exchange Trading Floors and 
the Growth of ECNs, 33 J. CORP. L. 865, 866 (2008) (providing a comprehensive history of the 
evolution of the securities exchanges). 
14. Arthur Kennickell et al., Recent Changes in U.S. Family Finances: Results from the 1998
Survey of Consumer Finances, 86 FED. RESERVE BULLETIN 1, 15 (table 6) (2000). 
15. Markham & Hardy, supra note 13, at 866. 
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recently as 1983, when only one fifth of households held any stocks.16 
Even if individuals are not directly invested in the markets, they are 
affected by the relationship between credit and the securities markets as 
was made so evident during the recent economic downturn.17  As such, the 
securities markets affect business, housing, education, consumption, and 
nearly everything that is remotely related to money.18 
This fundamental shift in the relationship between the markets and the 
lives of the average American makes it imperative that we carefully 
evaluate the evolution of the markets in the modern era. 
A. SETTING THE STAGE FOR MARKET AUTOMATION
In the early stages of the equity exchanges, traders met face to face
and agreed on transactions.19  Such a system worked well in 1827, when the 
average daily volume on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) was 
100 shares,20 but while traders and regulators have sung the praises of 
open-outcry trading as recently as 2007,21 the automation of the markets 
was inevitable.  The shift to electronic trading, motivated by concerns of 
efficiency, fairness, and competition, has led to a market that bears little 
resemblance to the trading pits from which they evolved. 
Where equities used to be primarily traded on the exchange on which 
they were listed, such as the NYSE, today there is instead a dispersed 
network of highly automated trading centers through which market 
participants can execute trades, all of which offer incentives and compete 
with each other in order to attract liquidity.22  In fact, contrary to what 
many investors might think, less than fifteen percent of domestic trading 
volume occurs on the NYSE exchange itself, and less than twenty percent 
on NASDAQ.23  This is a dramatic shift from the dominating position of 
the exchanges, which executed more than seventy percent of transactions in 
listed stocks in 2005, and more than fifty percent as recently as 2007.24  The 
16. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE AND THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, EQUITY
OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA, 2005 (2005), at 1. 
17. REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE MAJORITY, FROM WALL STREET 
TO MAIN STREET: UNDERSTANDING HOW THE CREDIT CRISIS AFFECTS YOU (Oct. 3, 2008), available at 
http://jec.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=b2087603-5883-4777-b13e-6b30845d4265. 
18. Id. 
19. Markham & Hardy, supra  note 13, at 869. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 896.  (Then Federal Reserve Chairman Allan Greenspan asserting that open-outcry
trading is “‘the optimum model’ because, while computers are useful, human beings always prefer 
personal interactions and that, therefore, open outcry markets will always be around.”). 
22. Graham Bowley, The New Speed of Money, Reshaping Markets, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 1, 2011),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/business/02speed.html?ref=highfrequencyalgorithmic 
trading&pagewanted=all; CONCEPT RELEASE, supra note 13, at 3594. 
23. CONCEPT RELEASE, supra note 13, at 3597. 
24. Markham & Hardy, supra note 13, at 910. 
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vast majority of trading now occurs on about a dozen Electronic 
Communications Networks (“ECNs”), such as Direct Edge and Better 
Alternative Trading System (“BATS”), as well as internal broker/dealer 
networks.25 
Another key development that cleared a path for the current state of 
computer-driven trading was the decimalization of equity prices in 2001. 
Here, exchanges started listing prices at intervals of $0.01 rather than the 
previous interval of 1/16th of a dollar.26  This policy change drastically 
reduced the advantage held by market makers,27 increased liquidity, and 
created a much more favorable environment for HFT programs that can 
capitalize on these small price changes.28 
The current electronic interconnection of ECNs and exchanges was 
cemented in 2005, when the SEC enacted Regulation National Market 
System (“Reg. NMS”).29  Congress enacted this bill on the assumption that 
liquidity and price stability would be improved by promoting competition 
between trading venues rather than allowing a few dominant exchanges.30  
Reg. NMS mandates that these widely dispersed networks work together as 
one “national market system.”31  As such, the exchanges must always route 
orders to the venue with the best price—and so a “buy” order filed on 
NYSE must be filled with the best available offer, regardless of whether the 
offer is on NYSE or one of the many other ECN’s or exchanges.32  All of 
this routing takes place in the blink of an eye, with minimal input from the 
trader. 
Without being able to compete by offering better prices, the ECN’s 
began to attract liquidity by offering low fees, extremely fast execution and 
25. Markham & Hardy, supra note 13, at 910; Bats System Performance, BATS (2011),
http://batstrading.com/resources/features/bats_ exchange_Latency.pdf; Graham Bowley, The New 
Speed of Money, Reshaping Markets, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 1, 2011). available at http://www. 
nytimes.com/2011/01/02/business/02speed.html?ref=high 
frequencyalgorithmictrading&pagewanted=all.  Note that the SEC often refers to ECNs as Alternative 
Trading Systems (“ATSs”) in their regulations. 
26. Michael J. McGowan, The Rise of Computerized High Frequency Trading: Use and
Controversy, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 16, ¶3 (2010). 
27. A “market maker” is a market participant with the affirmative responsibility to continuously
offer two-sided quotes in given securities, serving as the buyer or seller of last resort.  The role of 
market makers has diminished in the last decade, the implications of which are discussed infra, Part V. 
28. Id. 
29. Regulation NMS, 70 Fed. Reg. 37496, 37513 (June 29, 2005). 
30. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 11A, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (2006); see also PRELIMINARY
REPORT, supra note 3, at 81. 
31. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 51808, 70 Fed. Reg. 37496 (June 9, 2005), (“Regulation
NMS Release”). 
32. Id.  See SEC Report on the Market Events of May 6th, supra note 3; Testimony Concerning the
Severe Market Disruption on May 6, 2010 Before the H. Subcomm. On Capital Mkts., 111th Cong. 8–9 
(2010) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) 
[hereinafter Schapiro statement], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2010/ts051110 
mls.pdf. 
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latency times, and rebates for providing liquidity.33  Now, traders who use 
these ECN’s receive accurate pricing information in fewer than 250 
microseconds, and can enter and exit trades thousands of times per 
second.34  The liquidity rebates provided by the ECNs sometimes exceed 
the fees themselves, allowing HFT firms to trade with zero marginal cost.35  
This trading infrastructure has made it practical for market participants to 
trade on an extremely short timeframe, and with volume that would be 
shocking to previous generations of traders. 
Trading firms unsatisfied with these extremely short latencies have 
shortened their trade times by physically locating their trading servers near 
the exchanges.  Many firms buy up expensive real estate for the purpose of 
shaving microseconds off of their execution times (a practice referred to as 
“co-location”).36  The exchanges have reacted to this demand for 
collocation and low-latency trades, and have been scrambling to attract 
HFT firms to their exchanges.  The ECNs profit from such arrangements by 
charging HFT firms access fees for low-latency market data (which 
accounts for about half of their total revenue) and renting out collocation 
space at prices of up to $25,000 per month for a single rack of servers.37  
With the importance of speed for HFT strategies, competing firms have 
been locked in what has been called a “technological arms race,” in which 
they must constantly improve their systems in order to continue reaping 
their immense profits.38 
The incredible speed and interconnectivity of the markets has allowed 
the proliferation of complicated automated trading strategies, such as cross-
market or index arbitrage, where a program will buy or sell a derivative 
security while taking an opposite position in the underlying security—
profiting when their values merge.39  Thanks to electronic connectivity and 
price competition between exchanges, such trades can be done 
automatically, within a few millionths of a second, for a near-zero marginal 
cost. 
One more crucial market development that laid the groundwork for 
the proliferation of High Frequency Trading is the dramatic increase in 
leverage in the market.  Because most HFT strategies rely on very small 
price changes, they often take large or multitudinous positions in order to 
maximize their gains.  The rise of this type of strategy, combined with the 
33. CONCEPT RELEASE, supra note 13, at 3594. 
34. See e.g., BATS, Bats System Performance, http://batstrading.com/resources/features/bats_
exchange_Latency.pdf. 
35. CONCEPT RELEASE, supra note 13, at 3599. 
36. Id. at 3598. 
37. Graham Bowley, The New Speed of Money, Reshaping Markets, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 1, 2011),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/business/02speed.html?ref=highfrequencyalgorithmic 
trading&pagewanted=all. 
38. McGowan, supra note 26, at 16. 
39. Id. at 9.
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low cost of borrowing, has resulted in leverage ratios that—at their extreme 
—can reach 50/1.40  To put this in perspective, the hedge fund Long Term 
Capital Management, the near collapse of which in 1998 threatened the 
entire western financial system, operated with a leverage ratio of around 
25/1.41  While most hedge funds claim that they are leveraged around or 
less than 10/1, the calculations are complicated by the fact that many of 
these funds invest their borrowed funds in products that are leveraged 
themselves.42 
There are two major consequences of so much cheap leverage—
trading volume greatly increases, and downward trends are exacerbated as 
leveraged funds are forced to sell in order to avoid wiping out their entire 
principal.  Cheap leverage has also facilitated the rise of HFT firms and the 
leverage-dependant strategies they employ. 
With the stage set, algorithmic trading ascended to a dominant 
position in the securities markets.  Organizationally, some HFT firms are 
independent proprietary trading firms, some are hedge funds, and some are 
parts of larger broker/dealer firms.43  While some HFT firms are registered 
as broker-dealers, many are not.44  As such, they are not subject to reporting 
requirements, and indeed it is often impossible for the exchanges to 
ascertain their identity.45 
B. THE RISE OF HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING
For firms with the means to co-locate with exchanges and develop
HFT algorithms, the current infrastructure makes it extremely profitable to 
make millions of these short-term low-latency trades every day.46  For 
example, in 2008 it is estimated that HFT firms profited more than $20 
billion.47  Over the last few years, the prevalence of these automated HFT 
40. Nouriel Roubini, Credit Derivatives, Hedge Funds and Leverage Ratio’s of 50: The Credit House of 
Cards, ROUBINI GLOBAL ECONOMICS. (Jan 20, 2007), http://www.roubini.com/roubini- 
monitor/173905/credit_derivatives_hedge__funds_and_leverage_ratios_of_50_the_credit_house_of_cards. 
41. Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, 13 J.
OF ECON. PERSP., 189, 189 (1999); REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL 
MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, at 
12, (1999). 
42. Gillian Tett, The Unease Bubbling in Today’s Brave New Financial World, FT.COM, (Jan. 19,
2007), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/92f7ee6a-a765-11db-83e4-0000779e2340.html#axzz 
1Ff9UVqJz; HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, 
supra note 41, at 5–6. 
43. Schapiro statement, supra note 32, at 10–11. 
44. Id. 
45. CFTC-SEC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES, RECOMMENDATION
REGARDING REGULATORY RESPONSES TO THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010 (2011) [hereinafter 
“SUMMARY REPORT”]. 
46. Schapiro statement, supra note 32, at 10. 
47. “High-frequency traders generated about $21 billion in profits in 2008, the Tabb Group, a
research firm estimates.”  Charles Duhigg, Stock Traders Find Speed Pays, in Milliseconds, N.Y. 
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trading programs has quietly grown to the point where they now dominate 
the worldwide equity securities markets.48  Even though HFT firms 
represent only about two percent of trading firms, automated trading 
programs now account for between fifty percent and eighty percent of 
executed trading volume on domestic exchanges.49 
Further, these programs are the source of a much higher percentage of 
offers and bids that are never executed, most of which are cancelled 
immediately upon being issued.50  These orders are issued in order to 
ascertain hidden pricing information (known as “ping” orders), to slow 
down the systems of competing firms, and to serve as misinformation. For 
every 100 trades executed by an HFT firm, they issue up to one million of 
these false bids or offers.51 
Nearly all trading today is electronic, and algorithmic “smart” orders 
speed transactions throughout the national market system.  The 
terminology used to describe this algorithmic trading can be confusing, and 
is often used interchangeably.  Accordingly, some definitions and 
delineations are warranted here. 
“Algorithmic trading” has been used to refer to a wide spectrum of 
trading activity.  At one of the spectrum are the simple transactional tools 
made necessary by the fragmented market system, such as intermarket 
sweep orders—used by traders to speedily execute trades across separate 
markets.52  These types of algorithms allow traders to enter certain criteria 
into the program, such as pricing restraints, order size, time limitations, and 
volume limits.  For example, a trader wishing to quickly sell 10,000 shares 
of an equity will enter his order into the algorithm, which will then split the 
order into smaller pieces and execute a number of small transactions on the 
various exchanges and ECN’s, keeping within the limits specified by the 
trader.53  Other simple algorithms that are widely used include pegged 
orders (which follow the price of the market, either matching or taking the 
best bid or offer) and other algorithms that keep much of the size of the 
order hidden in “reserve” until the displayed order is executed.54  It was a 
simple algorithm such as one of the above that started the domino effect of 
TIMES, (July 24, 2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/24/business/24trading.html?ref 
=charlesduhigg. 
48. Duhigg, supra note 47
49. Id.; McGowan, supra note 26, at ¶ 4.
50. Duhigg, supra note 47. 
51. Memorandum from Themis Trading, LLC by Sal L. Arnuk & Joseph Saluzzi on Toxic Equity
Trading Order Flow on Wall Street: The Real Force Behind the Explosion in Volume and Volatility, 
http://www.themistrading.com/article_files/0000/0348/Toxic_Equity_Trading_on_Wall_Street_12-17-0 
8.pdf. 
52. Matt Phillips, Accenture’s Flash Crash: What’s an “Intermarket Sweep Order,” WALL ST. J.
BLOG (May 7, 2010, 5:51 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2010/05/07/accentures-flash-crash- 
whats-an-intermarket-sweep-order/. 
53. CONCEPT RELEASE, supra  note 13, at N65. 
54. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at Appendix A-4. 
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the May 6th flash crash.55 
At the other end of the spectrum are the intricately complicated and 
ever-evolving HFT programs.  These programs did not start the flash crash, 
but did cause it to accelerate across the national market system.  There is no 
uniform definition for High Frequency Trading, but HFT firms generally 
execute a high number of trades, use computers to plan and execute the 
trades, base their strategies on short time-frames, enter a large number of 
orders that are immediately cancelled, and end each trading day in a neutral 
trading stance.56  The relevant and dangerous characteristics of HFT 
programs are that they are extremely fast, dominate market volume, and do 
not rely on human traders to initiate trades.57  These are algorithm driven 
trading programs that make use of the simpler transactional orders 
described above, but employ them in a much broader trading scheme.  It is 
this type of algorithmic high frequency trading that poses systematic risks 
to the financial markets, as is discussed in Parts IV and V. 
The strategies used by HFT firms vary widely.  Many strategies are 
based purely on raw speed, in which the programs recognize imbalances or 
arbitrage opportunities, and trade against them before other market 
participants can access the liquidity.58  These types of strategies require co-
location of trading servers, extremely powerful computers, and constant 
tweaking of code in order stay ahead of competing firms.59  While these 
firms currently measure their trade speeds in microseconds, insiders claim 
that soon they will be trading in picoseconds—one trillionth of a second.60 
Other HFT strategies are based around the rebates offered by ECN’s 
for providing liquidity.  Here, the HFT programs offer two-sided quotes in 
given securities, and make their profit from the rebates rather than from big 
changes in price.61  This type of strategy has particularly high volume of 
cancelled orders, with HFT firms canceling ninety percent of the orders 
they submit.62 
Other strategies employed by HFT firms arouse more suspicion than 
do the market-making, arbitrage, or rebate strategies.  For example, 
“momentum ignition” trades involve initiating, accelerating, or 
exacerbating rapid price movements and benefiting from the results.63  This 
is accomplished by either “spoofing” other market participants into buying 
or selling aggressively, or else by triggering standing stop-loss orders that 
55. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at Appendix A-11. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. McGowan, supra note 26, at ¶¶ 16–17 (2010). 
59. Id. 
60. Michelle Price, The Rise of the Picosecond, EFINANCIALNEWS.COM., (Mar. 3. 2011),
http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2011-03-03/rise-of-the-picosecond. 
61. CONCEPT RELEASE, supra note 13, at 3607. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 3609;  Schapiro, supra note 32, at 21. 
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the algorithm has detected.64 
Similarly, “order anticipation strategies” involve detecting the 
presence of large buyers or sellers, and using the speed of the HFT 
programs to get into the market ahead of the large buyer or seller, thereby 
profiting when the larger buyer must drive up the price in order to fill their 
order.65  Such HFT strategies have some commentators crying foul, 
accusing HFT firms of engaging in automated front-running.66  Front-
running is when firms trade on insider knowledge of customer orders by 
trading in advance of the order, and is already illegal.  Whether such 
automated strategies are legal or not is a matter for debate, but is not the 
subject of this note.  Rather, this note address the structural weaknesses 
created by the proliferation of HFT strategies. 
The above HFT strategies, while often quite complicated, are still 
largely based on strategies that have been used by human traders for years. 
However, many HFT strategies have taken human discretion entirely out of 
the picture, relying on powerful artificial intelligence programs to 
determine how to trade.67  These programs use a wide range of inputs in 
addition to market data, including news reports, twitter feeds, blog posts, 
and even close-captioned TV broadcasts.68  A small cottage industry has 
been created to create feeds of such information than can be speedily 
consumed by these artificial intelligence HFT programs.69  These 
artificially intelligent programs create and test their own rules and 
assumptions, and constantly evolve in reaction to the markets and their own 
continuing calculations.70  As a result of these programs, a large portion of 
the trading volume in the U.S. is done without a single human knowing 
why.  For example, in early 2011, market observers postulated that HFT 
programs were buying up Warren Buffet’s Berkshire Hathaway stock 
whenever Anne Hathaway—who was about to host the Oscars—was 
mentioned in the news.71  The HFT programs were apparently mistaking 
Oscar buzz for trading buzz, and moving vast sums of money accordingly. 
64. CONCEPT RELEASE, supra  note 13, at 3609. 
65. Id. 
66. Robert Kuttner, Wall Street on Speed, HUFFINGTON POST, (July 26, 2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-kuttner/wall-street-on-speed_b_245121.html . 
67. Charles Duhigg, Artificial intelligence applied heavily to picking stocks, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 23,
2006), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/23/business/worldbusiness/23iht-trading.3647885 
.html [hereinafter Artificial Intelligence]. 
68. Graham Bowley, Computers that Trade on the News, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 22, 2010), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/13/business/23trading.html?_r=1&sq=high%20frequency%20 tradi 
ng&st= cse&scp=3&pagewanted=print. 
69. Bowley, supra note 68. 
70. McGowan, supra note 26, at ¶ 23.
71. Alexis Madrigal, Does Anne Hathaway News Drive Berkshire Hathaway’s Stock?, THE 
ATLANTIC.COM, (Mar. 18, 2011), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/03/ 
does-anne-hathaway-news-drive-berkshire-hathaways-stock/72661/.  Note also that a single share of 
this stock was worth more than $100,000 at the time. 
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When these programs combine with the staggering speed of the HFT 
networks at their disposal—which may soon be executing trades within 
trillionths of a second—the result is a market in which massively 
destructive price movements can occur before anyone can even begin to 
react. 
C. DANGEROUS RESULTS OF THE RISE OF MARKET AUTOMATION
The markets have been transformed by the increase in the speed of
trading, and by decreasing trading costs.  Trading volume is many orders of 
magnitude higher than just decades earlier.72  Tellingly, it is difficult to 
ascertain accurate volume information across the various exchanges, but 
the NASDAQ exchange—representing less than twenty precent of the 
equities market —has seen daily volumes of more than five billion shares.73 
This dramatic increase in volume is driven by several factors.  First, 
the ease, speed, and relative affordability of trading within the current 
market infrastructure allows a high rate of stock turnover.  It is not unheard 
of, for example, for a stock’s daily trading volume to exceed its float—
meaning that more shares trade hands in one day than there are total shares 
in the company.74  Indications suggest that turnover rates for mutual funds 
and traditional money managers have remained stable, but the rise of HFT 
strategies, often involving millions of trades within minutes, has driven 
trading volume ever upward.75 
III. THE INADEQUATE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
FOR HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING 
High-Frequency Trading firms owe much of their success to the fact 
that they operate within a largely unregulated niche of the market.  Despite 
their dominant role in day-to-day trading, they are not subject to the 
regulations or obligations affecting broker/dealers or market makers.76 
However, since events such as the May 6th flash crash, HFT activity 
has come under increased scrutiny, both from the public and from 
regulators.  Hoping to prevent such a flash crash from occurring again, the 
72. See Markham, supra note 13, at n.463 (stating that U.S. volume in futures markets quintupled
between 1996 and 2006). 
73. Statistical Milestones, NASDAQ.COM, http://quotes.nasdaq.com/aspx/StatisticalMilestones.aspx. 
74. See Cindy Perman, Dow Ends Up for Week Despite Bear Sell-Off, CNBC.com, (Mar. 14,
2008), http://www.cnbc.com/id/23634788/Dow_Ends_Up_for_Week_Despite_Bear_Sell_Off (stating 
that Bear Stearns broke the NYSE record with 186 Million share daily volume on Friday, March 14, 
2008). 
75. See Equity Brokerage Commission Averages Increase Slightly in the Major Markets and US Equity
Trading Volume Remains High Despite a Significant Decline in Listed Equity Securities, ELKINS MCSHERRY, 
LLC, (May 2010), https://www.elkinsmcsherry.com/EM/pdfs/.../May_2010_ newsletter.pdf. 
76. CONCEPT RELEASE, supra note 13, at 3607; Schapiro, supra note 32, at 13–14. 
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SEC and the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) have 
launched inquiries into the traumatic market events of May 6th, and have 
recommended regulatory reform.77  Some changes have already been 
implemented after the flash crash, particularly where HFT firms had been 
exploiting loopholes that were particularly egregious,78 whereas many more 
changes are still being pondered by the SEC.79  As a result, it is helpful to 
examine both the regulations in place before the flash crash, and the 
proposed changes that have been suggested since.  It is also useful to 
delineate between regulations affecting HFT firms directly, and regulations 
that affect the exchanges in a way that directly impacts HFT strategies. 
A. REGULATIONS ON HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING FIRMS BEFORE THE
FLASH CRASH
Before flash crash, HFT firms were not required to be registered as 
broker dealers.80  As such, they were not compelled to maintain the same 
capital requirements as their registered peers, or to adhere to the risk-
management regime required of registered broker/dealers.81  Further, even 
when HFT firms engaged in market-making behavior (“making a market” 
in a security by offering two-sided quotes), they were not required to 
register, and were therefore not subject to the obligations that registered 
market makers face.82  These obligations include continuously offering 
two-sided quotes, to be the buyer or seller of last resort in times of great 
market volatility, and to refrain from trades that would adversely affect 
volatility.83 
The obligations imposed on market makers has historically been 
justified by their advantageous position of having access to order-flow 
information, and being able to profit on the spread between the bids and 
offers, but such positions have become less lucrative since Regulation 
NMS decentralized order routing and allowed the HFT firms to outgun the 
market makers.84  As such, HFT firms have largely displaced traditional 
market makers, reaping the profits without taking the responsibilities of the 
77. The Joint Commission has released three reports on the flash crash, a preliminary report (supra 
note 3), a final report on the market events of May 6th (supra note 1), and a summary report of 
recommended regulations (supra note 45). 
78. For example, the use of “flash” orders and “stub quotes,” both of which are manipulative on
their face, has been discontinued.  See Discussion infra, Part III.C. 
79. See generally SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 45. 
80. Id. at 6.  However, a number of HFT entities are part of larger trading firms that are required to
register. See McGowan, supra note 26, at ¶ 30. 
81. McGowan, supra note 26, at ¶ 30.
82. Janet M. Angstadt, What will be the legacy of the ‘Flash Crash’? Developments in US equities
market regulation, 6 CAPITAL MARKETS LAW JOURNAL 1, 85 (2011).  Note that some options 
exchanges require any HFT firm acting as a market maker to register as such. 
83. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 45, at 10. 
84. Id. at 9–10. 
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traditional position.85  This resulted in the mass withdrawal from the market 
of the HFT “market makers” during the May 6th crash.86  This sudden 
exodus of liquidity, where previously market makers would be required to 
remain in the markets, exacerbated the downward fall.87 
During the flash crash, many HFT firms directly accessed the 
exchanges and ECN’s by being “sponsored” by a registered broker dealer, 
and using that dealer’s identification code.  This arrangement was referred 
to as “naked access,” and worried regulators because it gives HFT firms 
immediate and direct access to the markets, without subjecting them to the 
controls and rules that regulate other direct participants.88  Consequently, an 
HFT program could send out hundreds of thousands of faulty orders before 
the error is caught, which could result in a domino effect threatening the 
entire market.89 
Because of naked access and the lack of a need to register, there were 
almost no meaningful affirmative regulations on HFT firms before or 
during the flash crash.  They were not subject to any limitations in terms of 
leverage, exposure, or volume.  Nor were they compelled to disclose their 
risk parameters or financial statements in the way that large institutional 
investors are.  Accordingly, HFT firms were primarily constrained not by 
regulations on themselves, but by regulations on the markets. 
B. REGULATIONS ON THE MARKETS BEFORE THE FLASH CRASH
The exchanges and ECN’s are separate entities, operating under
different rules.90  They are subject both regulations from the SEC, and their 
own internal procedures.  As such, the procedures in place to keep order 
during market volatility are not uniformly applied, and have enjoyed 
decidedly limited success.  Even though a stock may be traded on ten 
ECN’s, the NASDAQ, and the NYSE at once, these different venues will 
trigger different regulatory constraints at different times.  As such, when 
markets become extremely volatile, market fragmentation worsens as, for 
example, NYSE slows down its order-matching and the other ECN’s allow 
trading to continue unhindered. 
Such an imbalanced response can make itself worse as exchanges cut 
off communications with the slowing exchange, using the “self help” 
remedy made available in Reg. NMS.91  Here, exchanges and ECNs are 
85. CONCEPT RELEASE, supra note 13, at 3494. 
86. Id. at 3494; Schapiro, supra note 32, at 5. 
87. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 15–17. 
88. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 45, at 7. 
89. McGowan, supra note 26, at ¶ 41.
90. Schapiro, supra note 32, at 6. Reg.  ATS applies only to ECNs, whereas NMS applies
to all trading venues.  Regulation Alternative Trading System, 17 C.F.R. § 242.300 (2007). 
91. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at Appendix A-15. 
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permitted to block orders and bids from exchanges that they believe to be 
experiencing delays or malfunctions.92  During the flash crash, two ECNs 
excluded the NYSE from their quotations using this remedy, further 
fragmenting the market and blocking off liquidity.93 
Perhaps the best way to examine how these independent controls work 
together is to evaluate their individual reactions to the flash crash.  The 
NYSE, the ECNs, and the Futures markets all took different steps at 
different times.94  The SEC’s examination of flash crash control measures 
suggests that some responses were more effective than others—but also 
that it is the decentralized nature of the response that was most 
problematic.95 
The crash originated in the futures markets, where the E-mini futures 
contracts were sold so hastily by the Kansas City trader.96  The SEC’s 
investigations suggest that the countermeasures in place in the futures 
markets were among the most effective but were not sufficient to keep this 
selling pressure from spreading and multiplying across the system.97  The 
futures market had in place a “trading pause,” which is triggered whenever 
further trading would cause stop-loss orders98 to drive down prices sixty 
basis points.99  When triggered, as it was on 2:45:28 on May 6th, all trading 
in the security is paused for five seconds to allow buyers to reenter the 
market.100  In the case of the flash crash, this trading pause had some 
success in the E-mini futures market, and the five second break resulted in 
buyers returning to the market, and prices quickly rebounded as soon as 
trading resumed.101 
Even after prices recovered in the futures markets, the crash migrated 
to the equities market and continued to accelerate, even for products that 
should trade in lock-step with the E-mini.102  This difference can be 
attributed to the exchanges’ differing responses to volatility. 
The NYSE uses a unique volatility control called liquidity 
replenishment points (“LRPs”).103  While based on the same principle as 
the aforementioned trading pauses, LRP’s differ because they do not stop 
trading, but rather slow it down—stopping automated trades and allowing 
92. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at Appendix A-15. 
93. Id. at 26, n.13.
94. Id. at 45.
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 2.
97. Id. at 4.
98. A stop-loss order is a standing order to sell a security when it trades at a given price. Once
triggered, the stop-loss order seeks to immediately sell, regardless of price.  See Schapiro, supra note 
32, at 7. 
99. Id. at 12, n.20; SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 45, at 5. 
100. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 45, at 5. 
101. Id. at 12.
102. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 45, at 12–13. 
103. Id. at 68; Schapiro, supra note 32, at 6. 
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the designated market maker to manually match up bids and offers with a 
degree of discretion.104  Another difference is their indefinite duration, in 
that LRPs do not have set time limits.105  The trigger for these slow downs 
vary with the volume and price of the stock, but are simple to calculate and 
predictable.106  LRPs are quite common, with twenty to thirty stocks 
triggering significant LRPs daily, but on May 6th, more than 1000 stocks 
entered into extended LRP periods.107 
Any utility of LRPs is completely destroyed by one obvious flaw: they 
only apply to the NYSE.  Consequently, during such a self-imposed 
slowdown, trading continues unabated on the ECNs and other exchanges. 
Market participants are able to automatically route their orders away from 
the NYSE, completely sidestepping this measure.108  In either case, the 
LRPs did little to stop the downward momentum in the equities markets, as 
market participants easily routed their orders to the willing ECNs.109  The 
LRPs are credited for the NYSE’s lack of cancelled trades, as contrasted 
with the high rate of cancelled trades on the ECNs, but it is likely that this 
is simply because trades were routed elsewhere when LRPs were in effect. 
Another restraint on volatility in place on May 6th were cross-market 
circuit breakers.110  These circuit breakers were established after the crash 
of October 27, 1987, with the hope of improving stability in the markets 
after that one-day decline of almost twenty-three percent.111  These circuit 
breakers cease all trading when the Dow Jones Industrial Average drops by 
a given percentage.112  At the time of the flash crash, the circuit breakers 
would only be triggered if the Dow Jones Industrial Average dropped ten 
percent—a level that was never reached during the crash.113  As such, these  
circuit breakers, which would have halted trading in affected securities 
across all venues, were never deployed. 
While not a restraint in the same sense as circuit breakers or short-
selling rules, many investors withdrew from the markets during the flash 
crash because they feared that their transactions would be cancelled under 
the relatively vague trade cancellation rules.114  Before the flash crash, 
trades were cancelled whenever they were determined by FINRA to have 
been “clearly erroneous.”115  For trades made during the flash crash, 
104. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 68. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 68, n.53.
107. Id. at 69.
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at Appendix C4. 
111. Id. at Appendices C1, C3. 
112. Schapiro, supra note 32, at 13.
113. Id. at 13.
114. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 39. 
115. Id. at 35.
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executions that were at prices more than sixty percent  away from the pre-
crash value were considered to meet this threshold.116  While there are 
guidelines for determining when trades were “clearly erroneous,” there was 
a large degree of discretion allowed to the exchanges in making these 
decisions.117  Many habitual liquidity providers, fearing that that cancelled 
trades would leave them with unintentional positions in the market, 
withdrew from the market entirely during the flash crash.118 
C. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AFTER THE FLASH CRASH
The massive volatility of May 6th, 2010, has led to calls for increased
controls over market volatility and an increased sense of urgency for 
reform.119  Many changes have been proposed by market observers and by 
the Advisory Committee established by the SEC and CFTC, and a small 
number of rule changes have already gone into effect. 
The first rules to be established by the SEC since the crash have 
addressed practices that were previously legal, but widely seen as 
deceptive. The elimination of “stub quotes” is chief among these changes. 
Stub quotes are bids or offers that are far removed from the best price 
available for a given security in a given market.  For example, for a stock 
trading around $50, a bid of one cent or an offer of $100 would be 
considered a stub quote.120  Prior to the rule change, stub quotes were used 
either by market makers who wanted to technically fulfill their obligations 
of maintaining two-sided quotes while avoiding any actual risk, or by HFT 
firms seeking to capitalize on momentary glitches in the NMS system that 
would allow hapless counter parties to execute against their quote.121 
It was quotes like these that caused the most outlandish trades of the 
flash crash—such as Accenture trading at one cent, minutes after trading at 
$40, or Sotheby’s selling for $99,999 minutes after selling for under $35.122  
Such transactions can occur when investors enter a market order, which 
must be executed at the best available price immediately.123  In times of 
high volatility, systemic glitches, or low liquidity, such stub quotes can 
indeed be the best available price at the millisecond when the order must be 
executed, even if it is far removed from the prevailing market or the last 
price.  This dynamic is intensified during downturns, as “stop loss” orders 
are triggered, which are market orders set to deploy when a certain price is 
116. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 35. 
117. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 29. 
118. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 39. 
119. Schapiro, supra note 32, at 1.
120. Angstadt, supra note 82, at 83; Schapiro, supra note 32 at 7. 
121. Schapiro, supra note 32 at 7; FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 67–68. 
122. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 33–34, 54. 
123. Schapiro, supra note 32, at 7.
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reached.124  There were more than 200 securities in which there were stub-
quote executions during the flash crash.125 
Stub quotes, while previously tolerated, are inherently disingenuous 
and were probably contrary to the preexisting requirement that all bids and 
offers be bona fide expressions of interest.  The SEC has taken steps to 
curb their practice since the flash crash, by requiring that all quotes be 
within a given pricing range from the national best price.126  While these 
new rules are only part of a pilot program, it is likely that the SEC will 
enact similar permanent rules eliminating exploitative stub quotes. 
The SEC has already closed another obvious loophole by ending the 
practice of unfiltered “naked access,” whereby HFT firms could interact 
directly with exchanges and ECN’s by using a sponsoring broker’s 
credentials.127  Since the flash crash, the SEC has mandated that 
broker/dealers may not provide such unfiltered access to the markets, and 
requires those brokers who supply HFT firms with access, to put in place 
procedures and risk management devices to ensure regulatory 
compliance.128 
An amendment to Regulation SHO—a regulation limiting short 
selling—went into force quickly after the flash crash.  It aims to limit 
selling pressure on vulnerable stocks by limiting the ability of traders to 
sell stock that they do not already own.129  Now, after an individual NMS 
security130 decreases more than ten percent, market participants who do not 
already own the stock will be unable to sell it by taking liquidity away from 
the buy side, although they will remain free to sell by making offers.131  
This rule was intended to cut down on what was perceived as manipulative 
short-selling and deliberate deflation of already vulnerable securities.132 
Another reform already made by the SEC is the adoption of market-
wide circuit breakers for individual stocks.133  In June, 2010, a pilot 
program was initiated whereby circuit breakers would be triggered across 
all venues if the price changes by ten percent or more within any five- 
124. Schapiro, supra note 32, at 7.
125. Id. at 10.
126. Angstadt, supra note 82, at 83; SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 45, at 3–4. 
127. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 45, at 7. 
128. Press Release 2010-210, Securities Exchange Commission, (Nov. 3, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-210.htm. 
129. Press Release 201-26, Securities Exchange Commission, 201-26, available at http://www.
sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-26.htm; Press Release 34-60388, Amendments to Regulation SHO, (July 
27, 2009), available at http://sec.gov/rules/final/2009/34-60388.pdf. 
130. For the purposes of this rule, “NMS security” excludes options, but includes stocks and futures.
Press Release 34-6195, Securities Exchange Commission, Amendments to Regulation SHO, (Feb. 26, 
2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2010/34-61595.pdf. 
131. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 55. 
132. Id. at 60.
133. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 45, at 3. 
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minute period between 9:45 a.m. and 3:35 p.m.134  If the circuit breaker is 
triggered, trading in the affected security pauses in all markets for at least 
five minutes, allowing investors to evaluate the rapid market events, correct 
any errors, and allow liquidity to rebalance.135  Importantly, these circuit 
breakers are only applied to the securities included in the Russell 1000 
index and certain highly traded Exchange Traded Funds (“ETFs”).136  The 
Advisory Committee recognized that the circuit breakers will have limited 
effect unless they are more widely applied, and has recommended that they 
be expanded to cover “all but the most inactively traded listed securities, 
ETFs, and options and single stock futures on those securities.”137 
The Committee also recommended that a new procedure be enacted 
across the exchanges to supplement the new circuit breakers, dubbed a 
“limit up/limit down” process.138  When triggered, the process would allow 
trading to continue in the affected security only within a given price band, 
although trading within that band would continue freely.139  The limit 
would be lifted whenever contra-side liquidity appears outside of the 
band.140 
While the SEC recognized that the future’s market’s existing “pause” 
procedure worked relatively well during the flash crash, it recommended 
that there be secondary measures put in place for circumstances where the 
five-second pause is insufficient to lure back liquidity to the markets.141 
Another recommendation from the Committee that is likely to be 
implemented is that the preexisting market wide circuit breakers be 
triggered by movements of the S&P 500 index, rather than the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average, which was the benchmark during the flash crash.142  
The S&P 500 is now considered to be more representative of overall 
market sentiment than the Dow, and trades in lockstep with the important 
and high-volume securities such as the E-Mini futures and the SPY ETF.143  
In addition to this change of triggering index, the Committee suggested that 
the length of time of the trading halts be reduced, and that the halts should 
be allowed as late as 3:30 p.m., cutting deeper into the period of high 
volatility at the end of the trading day.144 
134. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 45, at n.1. Note that this time window excludes the more
volatility opening and closing periods, where trading volume is much higher. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 4.
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 4–5.
139. Id. at 5.
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 6.
143. Id. The SPY ETF is an exchange traded fund that tracks the S&P 500 index. It is used widely
as a hedging device as well as diversified investment vehicle, as it represents the entire basket of S&P 
500 stocks. 
144. Id. at 6.
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The Advisory Committee made clear that HFT firms were 
exacerbating influences on the flash crash.  Accordingly, it recommended 
that the SEC and CFTC should assert their regulatory role and require HFT 
firms to demonstrate that their programs have been carefully tested, and 
would not create undue market volatility.145  Specifically, the Committee 
recommended that this supervisory focus be directed at the sponsoring 
firms, rather than the HFT firms themselves.146 
It should be noted that the SEC has also proposed a ban on “flash 
orders,” which allow paying subscribers to access market data before other 
investors.147  While the proposed rule change has not yet gone into effect, 
and has been fought by exchanges who profit from the fees and increased 
liquidity they provide, such orders have now been disabled at all exchanges 
except for the options exchanges.148  These orders are often conflated with 
the wider practice of high frequency trading, perhaps due to their catchy 
name, and the media has attached their name to the flash crash.  However, 
these flash orders are not considered by the SEC to be the main catalysts 
for their namesake market crash. 
D. THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE’S RECOMMENDATIONS DIRECTED AT
IMPROVING LIQUIDITY
Hoping to address structural issues that allow for liquidity to rapidly  
disappear from the markets, the Advisory Committee also made general 
recommendations for improving liquidity.149 
The Committee’s first volley at the liquidity problem was to suggest 
reform to the liquidity rebate system.150  In the current system, exchanges 
and ECNs offer different fee structures and incentives for liquidity 
providers.151  These fees and rebates incentivize market participants and 
HFT firms to add liquidity to the system—for example by using limit 
orders rather than market orders.152  However, as the Advisory Committee 
noted, the incentives were not enough to keep these participants from 
fleeing the markets when volatility increased.153  As a possible 
145. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 45, at 6. 
146. Id. 
147. Press Release 34-60684, Securities Exchange Commission, Elimination of Flash Order
Exception from Rule 602 of Regulation NMS, (Jan. 14, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/proposed/2009/34-60684.pdf. 
148. Nina Mehta, Flash Order Debate Moves to Options After Direct Edge Bows Out, BLOOMBERG,
(Mar. 1, 2011), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-01/flash-order-debate-moves-to 
-options-after-direct-edge-bows-out.html.
149. Id. at 8.
150. Id. 
151. CONCEPT RELEASE, supra note 13, at 3599. 
152. For the SEC’s short explanation of varying order types see PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note
3, at 94–95. 
153. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 45 at 9. 
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improvement, the Advisory Committee proposed that a “peak load” pricing 
model be adopted, where access fees and rebates both rise in volatile 
market conditions, incentivizing liquidity providers to stay in the 
markets.154 
One of reasons that market participants withdrew from the market 
during the flash crash, according to interviews with the Advisory 
Committee, is that they feared that some of their trades would be cancelled 
after the fact, which could decimate their risk parameters and leave them 
with unwanted positions.155  While the futures markets had in place clear 
guidelines as to when trades could be “busted,” the equities markets were 
less clear.156  Instead, the prevailing rule was for trades to be broken when 
they were “clearly erroneous.”157  The SEC has taken action to remove this 
ambiguity from the system, however, by establishing clear thresholds 
within which trades will not be broken.158 
As noted previously, designated market makers have been largely 
pushed out of the markets by HFT firms who lack the obligations and 
responsibilities of the traditional position.159  The committee noted that 
HFT firms profit greatly from their opportunistic market-making activities, 
but that they withdrew from their roles of liquidity providers during the 
flash crash, exacerbating the downturn.160  However, the Committee also 
lamented that the majority of HFT firms engaging in market-making are 
not even registered as broker-dealers, and so it is difficult to regulate their 
obligations directly.161  Nonetheless, the Committee recommended that 
incentives and rules be created to address this void in the market, created 
by the mass exodus of the designated market-makers after the rise of HFT 
strategies.162 
The Committee also noted that HFT, despite its proponent’s constant 
proclamations that they are driving costs down, actually create significant 
costs for all market participants because of the extremely high rate of 
orders that they issue and cancel.163  This massive flow of orders requires 
all market participants to constantly upgrade their computers and server 
capacity.  Some observers have claimed that this is a competitive tactic in 
the HFT arms race—whereby HFT firms, knowing that their powerful 
computers and co-location will allow them to handle the flow of data—
pump massive amounts of immediatelycancelled orders into the system 
154. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 45, at 9. 
155. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 39. 
156. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at Appendix B. 
157. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. 
158. Angstadt, supra note 82, at 83–84. 
159. See discussion, supra Part III C.
160. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 45, at 10. 
161. Id. at 10-11.
162. Id. at 10.
163. Id. at 11.
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purely to slow down their competitors’ systems.164  Even without such 
malicious motives, the high rate of cancelled orders imposes costs across 
the market.165  Accordingly, the committee recommended that charges be 
assessed to market participants who enter a large number of order 
cancellations.166 
The SEC and CFTC also addressed the practice of preferential routing, 
which they suggest worsened the flash crash.167  In this practice, firms route 
their orders preferentially to broker-dealers, who then execute the orders 
against their own undisplayed liquidity for a price that is a few sub-pennies 
better than the best displayed price.168  This seems to be in contravention of 
the order preference hierarchy established by Reg. NMS, but the firms have 
justified it by claiming that the price improvement justifies these trades.169  
As such, the committee recommended that rules be established by which 
this practice would only be justified in cases of “material” price 
improvement, or if the firms involved were required to provide liquidity 
during period of market volatility, under obligations similar to those of a 
traditional market-maker.170 
On a similar note, the committee addressed the practice of 
“internalizing” order flow, by which a clearing broker-dealer can match an 
incoming order against its own liquidity even if there are preexisting orders 
at the same price displayed on the NMS system.171  The Committee 
suggested a “trade at” rule that would bar this practice, although it would 
allow firms to match the orders as long as they improved the price.172  
Industry insiders, however, do not anticipate such a rule will ever be 
enacted.173 
Noting that the speed of the markets allows liquidity imbalances to 
quickly spread disorder throughout the markets, the Committee also 
recommended that the SEC consider greater information reporting 
requirements on liquidity measures and imbalances.174 
Finally, the Committee addressed the simple and ubiquitous problem 
that faces anyone who attempts to make sense of the markets: there is no 
164. Analysis of the “Flash Crash”, NANEX, http://www.nanex.net/20100506/FlashCrashAnalysis_
CompleteText.html (May 6, 2010). 
165. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 45, at 11. 
166. Id. at 11.
167. Id. at 12.
168. Id. 
169. Id.  Orders are given priority first by price, then by time. Further, displayed liquidity is always
given priority over non-displayed liquidity (for example the hidden reserve size in a reserve order), 




173. Telis Demos, Traders do not Anticipate ‘Trade At’ Rules, FT.COM, (Mar. 3. 2011),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/06caa75c-4455-11e0-931d-00144feab49a.html#axzz1G8BipDHR. 
174. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 45, at 14. 
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consolidated source of market data.175  With information spread throughout 
the various exchanges, ECNs, and market participants, it is near impossible 
to keep track of, much less effectively regulate, the markets.  As such, the 
committee recommended that the SEC and CFTC implement a 
“consolidated audit trail” for the equity and futures markets.176 
IV. WHY THE REGULATORY RESPONSE
TO FLASH CRASH IS INSUFFICIENT
The responses of the SEC and CFTC to the flash crash are steps in the 
right direction, but are ultimately insufficient to disarm the threat of 
another flash crash.  The grab bag of regulations and suggested reforms 
addresses key symptoms of systemic weakness, but does little to address 
the underlying malady—the proliferation of high-frequency trading in a 
hyper-connected market. 
Not everything that the SEC has done is useless.  The elimination of 
stub quotes, the call for a consolidated audit trail, and the clarification of 
trade-break rules will all help ensure a more transparent and predictable 
market. 
The stock-specific circuit breakers have the promise of effecting 
positive change, but they are too weakened to actually have the intended 
effect.  First, they are only applied to major equities—even in the 
strengthened version recommended by the committee.177  This leaves a 
substantial portion of the equities markets unaffected by this regulation, 
which will limit its ability to slow a crash as market participants will shift 
their orders to the unaffected securities.  Further, this limited range of the 
circuit breakers will create untenable situations in which derivative 
securities—such as ETF’s or futures contracts—continue to trade freely 
while the underlying security is halted.178  Such a situation would therefore 
undermine the integrity of the markets without doing enough to protect 
them.  However, if the procedural and practical hurdles were ironed out to 
the point where these circuit breakers could be uniformly and widely 
applied across the markets, they could serve to enhance market stability. 
The proposals for a “limit-up/limit-down” band, combined with the 
revamped circuit breakers, could also improve market stability.  However, 
this hybridized system would be limited by the efficacy of the circuit 
breakers.  Such a system would do more to mitigate the weaknesses of 
circuit breakers than to actually prevent a crash.  Functionally, in an 
extremely volatile market situation, these pricing bands would effectively 
175. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 45, at 14.; Schapiro statement, supra note 32, at 3–4. 
176. Schapiro statement, supra note 32, at 3–4. 
177. Id. at 3.
178. Serritella, supra note 2, at 441. 
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work as circuit breakers, and are subject to the same problems facing such 
circuit breakers, such as their limited scope and the fact that they could halt 
derivates while not halting their underlying security.179 
The limitations on naked access is also a positive step, and ensures 
that the number of entirely irresponsible HFT trading programs will 
decrease at least somewhat—as sponsoring firms will be required to vouch 
for the quality of the algorithms they host.  It seems decidedly unlikely, 
however, that the already understaffed180 SEC will be able to exercise 
effective oversight of HFT firms in this capacity, especially as the 
algorithms continuously evolve independent of human involvement.181 
In general, the regulatory response to the flash crash has been 
scattered.  Some of the proposed and enacted rule changes are indeed 
needed, and are likely to have a salutary impact on the markets and investor 
confidence.  Other rules are too weak, riddled with exceptions, or easily 
circumvented to have any real effect.  All of the proposed rules are aimed 
at the symptoms of the underlying structural weakness of the market.  The 
SEC should instead focus on addressing the weakness itself. 
V. A BETTER SOLUTION—VOLATILITY BASED
TRADING RESTRICTIONS 
Any reform that can disarm the threat of another flash crash must 
address the underlying issues that allowed the market disruption to spread 
like wildfire: the tremendous speed and interconnectivity of the markets, 
and the proliferation of high-speed automated trading. 
The SEC should enact measures that slow down the market to speeds 
that human investors can follow whenever volatility is at risk of spiraling 
out of control.  Such regulations could allow HFT firms to function as they 
presently do, as long as fear and volatility are within normal ranges. 
However, the rules should prohibit HFT programs from taking complete 
control of the market during rapid downturns, and return control to human 
traders.  This could be easily accomplished by using a widely known index 
of investor confidence to trigger minimum time limits for holding positions 
and making orders. 
Currently, the SEC uses percentage changes in equity indexes to 
determine when certain market controls will be triggered, such as circuit 
breakers and short-selling restrictions.182  In establishing new market 
controls, the SEC should trigger them with changes in investor fear levels, 
179. Schapiro statement, supra note 32, at 4. 
180. Robert Schmidt & Jesse Hamilton, SEC ‘Capacity Gap’ Risks Oversight Lapses as Regulator’s
Targets Multiply, BLOOMBERG, (Mar.6, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-01/flash- 
order-debate-moves-to-options-after-direct-edge-bows-out.html. 
181. McGowan, supra note 26, at ¶ 22.
182. For an explanation of the triggering factors see SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 45. 
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as measured by the “fear index”: otherwise known as the Volatility Index 
(“VIX”).183  For example, a value of 30 on the VIX indicates that investors 
are beginning to worry about volatility, and a reading of forty (which was 
surpassed during the flash crash) indicates that investors are pulling out of 
the market en mass.184  Accordingly, if the SEC were to trigger a market 
slowdown at a VIX reading of thirty-five, the controls could allow 
investors to reassess conditions and their market positions, rather than 
withdraw as they did during the flash crash.185  This index is widely 
followed and transparently calculated. 186  Therefore, it would be simple for 
HFT firms to anticipate and plan for the constraints it would trigger. 
One way to achieve this controlled market slowdown would be to 
enforce a minimum time limit on orders.187  As noted previously, HFT 
strategies often rely on placing and immediately cancelling thousands of 
orders per second.188  The reasons for placing these immediate-or-cancel 
orders are dubious—either to find hidden pricing information or to slow 
down opposing systems.189  A time limit on such orders, for example 
requiring all orders to remain executable for at least one second, would 
have multiple beneficial effects in the market system.  First, it would 
effectively eliminate the manipulative and expensive practice of “quote 
stuffing.”190  This would lower trading costs for all market participants who 
currently must consistently update their systems to keep up with the order 
flow that this practice produces.  Second, and most importantly, it would 
slow the lightning-fast withdrawals from the market of HFT firms.  If the 
SEC is unwilling to establish this time-limit as a permanent rule, it should 
consider triggering this rule when the VIX reaches a point where investor 
confidence is severely shaken. 
As a corollary to the minimum order time limits, a minimum holding 
time would also be effective in slowing declines.  For example, during the 
flash crash, HFT firms eagerly bought up thousands of the futures contracts 
being sold by the Kansas City mutual fund trader, only to immediately turn 
around and sell them—exacerbating the downward pressure.191  Indeed, the 
practice of holding shares for extremely short time frames amplifies and 
183. Robert E. Whaley, UNDERSTANDING VIX (Nov. 6, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1296743 (explaining the VIX index and how it is calculated); WHITE PAPER: THE CBOE 
VOLATILITY INDEX – VIX. available at  www.cboe.com/micro/vix/vixwhite.pdf. 
184. Schapiro statement, supra note 32, at 2. 
185. Id.; Julianne Pepitone, Fear Index Soars to 14 Month High, CNN MONEY.COM (May 20, 2010)
(reporting that the VIX surpassed the May 6th benchmark later in the month). 
186. Whaley, supra note 183. 
187. Themis, supra note 51. 
188. CONCEPT RELEASE, supra note 13, at 23. 
189. Flash Crash Analysis, NANEX, http://www.nanex.net/20100506/FlashCrashAnalysis_Complete
Text.html (June 8, 2010). 
190. Arnuk, supra note 51, at 5. 
191. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 3.
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accelerates price volatility across the board.192  However, were market 
participants compelled to hold onto their shares for longer—even for a few 
seconds—volatility would greatly decrease.  Further, this would reduce the 
speed of the market to human levels, allowing human traders to evaluate 
market actions and decide what actions are appropriate. 
These two constraints, establishing minimum time frames for orders 
and holding periods, would force trading to slow to a pace that humans 
could follow, while also minimizing any aggressive directional 
“momentum ignition” strategies193 that could further disrupt a volatile 
market.  This slowdown state could be triggered only when investors are 
considering fleeing the market, as indicated by the “fear index,” allowing 
HFT firms to trade normally under normal conditions. 
Constructed in this manner, the time limitations would not cause high-
frequency trading to completely dry up, and would allow them to function 
normally during market conditions.  As such, the HFT firms would be able 
to profit from normal market making and other activities, but not from 
accelerating massive volatility events such as the flash crash. 
Alternatively, there is always the nuclear option for ensuring market 
stability: a transaction tax.  Such a tax, even as small as $0.0025 cents per 
share, would effectively eliminate HFT trading.  HFT trading strategies are 
only profitable because it is so cheap to enter and exit trades, even while 
highly leveraged.  If the cost of trading were raised even at this marginal 
level, HFT programs would have to rely on bigger price moves, which 
would result in far fewer trades overall.  In contrast, the average investor 
who buys 200 shares at a time would only see his costs rise by fifty cents. 
This cost could be easily absorbed by the broker, who would no longer be 
required to update its system on a monthly basis in order to keep up with 
HFT order flow.194 
The constant argument against regulating trading has not changed in 
generations: the HFT firms argue that they are liquidity providers, and 
therefore are a stabilizing influence that would be destroyed by such rules. 
This argument is spurious.  When the SEC banned floor traders after their 
role in the great depression, the traders and exchanges claimed that they 
were a boon to the average investor because they provided liquidity, 
despite having access to nonpublic information and being able to collude 
for their own benefit.195  Today, HFT firms make the same claim.  They 
point to statistics showing that they are responsible for more than half of 
the trading activity, and even more of the nontransaction pricing activity.196  
They claim that without their massive trading volume, retail investors 
192. Arnuk, supra note 51, at 4. 
193. See discussion, supra Part II.
194. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 45, at 11. 
195. Markham, supra note 13, at 877. 
196. See Schapiro statement, supra note 32, at 10–11. 
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would have fewer willing buyers or sellers, and volatility would increase.197  
However, multiple scholars and the SEC have noted that the massive 
volume created by HFT firms does not increase liquidity by itself.198  As 
the SEC has noted, just because there is constant high-speed trading does 
not mean that there is any increase in liquidity or stability.199  To the 
contrary, volatility in recent years has increased even as volume has 
skyrocketed.200 
The biggest hole in the argument that HFT firms provide liquidity is 
the fact that they withdraw from the markets in period of high volatility, 
exactly when such liquidity is most needed to prevent serious downturns.201  
The flash crash is a stark example: firms that are usually happy to provide 
liquidity and make markets in low volatility all but pulled out of the 
markets.202  With traditional market makers displaced by the HFT firms, 
there was nobody left to fill this liquidity void.203  As such, it seems clear 
that in the current regulatory framework, HFT trading does little to increase 
liquidity, and has actually driven from the market the traditional liquidity 
providers such as designated market makers—leaving the liquidity 
landscape subject to their own whims. 
Robbed of their primary defense, high frequency traders have little to 
justify the risks they pose.  The more aggressive of the proposed 
regulations above may destroy the current state of high-frequency trading, 
but the average investor will not be harmed if this industry ceases to exist. 
To the contrary, without the potential destructive power of the HFT 
programs, long term investors will actually benefit from increased 
consumer and investor confidence. 
VI. CONCLUSION
The domestic securities markets are highly and intrinsically 
interconnected, and that trend is not going to reverse.  On a seemingly 
weekly basis, national exchanges are merging into international exchanges, 
and investors are yawning in response.204  This interconnectedness is surely 
a good thing for investors, who have an unprecedented if daunting array of 
197. McGowan, supra note 26, at ¶¶ 47-52. 
198. FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 3, 6; Serritella, supra note 2, at 438. 
199. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 45, at 2. 
200. Arnuk, supra note 51, at 4. 
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investment options available to them.  However, this efficient and wide-
ranging market has been abused to the point of systemic failure by the 
prevalence of high frequency trading. 
On the individual level, few single HFT strategies are problematic.205  
Such innovation is inherent and healthy in a competitive market. 
Additionally, the automation of trading—especially with large orders or for 
cross market orders—is far more efficient and easy than it would be to 
make such trades manually.  However, the aggregate effect of thousands of 
such programs, all locked in a technological arms race with trillion-dollar 
stakes, is a market system that can self-destruct because of a single trade or 
mistake. 
The complicated interplay of these programs, combined with the 
rising prevalence of artificial intelligence-based systems, has resulted in a 
market that moves faster than humans can follow, for reasons that even the 
programmers do not fully understand.206  Events such as the flash crash of 
May 6th, 2010, illustrate that this is not just a potential harm posed by these 
arrays of HFT firms—but rather a concrete and imminent danger of another 
substantial destruction of wealth and American economic stability. 
It is clear that the interests of the HFT investors, who profit from 
short-term price movements at the risk of long-term stability, are not 
aligned with the interests of long-term investors.  The SEC has a duty to 
protect the interests of such long-term investors when such a conflict arises, 
as it has repeatedly asserted.207 
In this note, a solution is proposed in which high frequency trading 
could be slowed down in periods of crisis, while continuing to operate 
freely in normal markets.208  Such a solution would not dramatically 
handicap the immensely profitable HFT industry, but the regulatory bodies 
should not be afraid of taking more drastic measures.  To rebuild investor 
confidence, and to prevent another more devastating version of the flash 
crash, the SEC and CFTC should make assertive and comprehensive moves 
to contain the threats posed by high-frequency trading. 
205. This does not take into account controversial strategies such as “order anticipation” strategies
or “momentum ignition” strategies, which many could consider to be inherently damaging to market 
integrity. 
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